In Attorney General for New South Wales v Love, the appellant argued that section 24 of the Act 9 Geo 4 c 83 did not have the effect applying the Nullum Tempus Act (9 Geo 3 c 16) (1768) to New South Wales. Counsel for the appellant said that Whicker v Hume decided that section 24 referred not to laws generally, but only to laws as to modes of procedure, and that the Nullum Tempus Act did not deal merely with procedure. The Lord Chancellor said that the Act 9 Geo 4 c 83 prima facie "applied the Nullum Tempus Act to the Colony in question as much as if it had re-enacted it for that Colony." He then said:
Sect. 24 of that Act provides "that all the laws and statutes in force within the realm of England at the passing of this Act" (that is to say, the year 1828) "shall be applied in the administration of justice in the courts of New South Wales," and it is sought by construction to limit the words "all laws and statutes" by introducing into the section the words "having relation to procedure" or some equivalent expression. At least that is the only intelligible mode in which the argument can be supported, because the words which do occur in the section - "in the administration of justice" - would certainly include a limitation of the time within which actions can be brought, and their Lordships are of the opinion that the language of the section cannot be limited so as to exclude the statute, which for the reasons pointed out by the learned judges were and are so important in the administration of justice in the Colony.
Section 92(14) of the Constitution Act, 1867, also known as the administration of justice power, grants the provincial legislatures of Canada the authority to legislate on:
Section 1 of the Administration of Justice Act (RSO 1990 c A6) provides:
In this Act, "administration of justice" means the provision, maintenance and operation of,